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Abstract
We generalise the result of [H. Ganzinger, C. Meyer, M. Veanes, The two-variable guarded frag-
ment with transitive relations, in: Proc. 14th IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, IEEE
Computer Society Press, 1999, pp. 24–34] on decidability of the two variable monadic guarded frag-
ment of first order logic with constraints on the guard relations expressible in monadic second order
logic. In [H. Ganzinger, C. Meyer, M. Veanes, The two-variable guarded fragment with transitive
relations, in: Proc. 14th IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, IEEE Computer Society
Press, 1999, pp. 24–34], such constraints apply to one relation at a time. We modify their proof to
obtain decidability for constraints involving several relations. Now we can use this result to prove de-
cidability of multi-modal modal logics where conditions on accessibility relations involve more than
one relation. Our main application is intuitionistic modal logic, where the intuitionistic and modal
accessibility relations usually interact in a non-trivial way.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we present a new general way of proving decidability of multi-modal
modal logics. This method relies on the result of Ganzinger, Meyer and Veanes [14], that
✩ This research was supported by the EPSRC grant GR/M98050/01.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: nza@cs.nott.ac.uk (N. Alechina), dxc@cs.nott.ac.uk (D. Shkatov).1570-8683/$ – see front matter © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jal.2005.06.007
220 N. Alechina, D. Shkatov / Journal of Applied Logic 4 (2006) 219–230a monadic two-variable guarded fragment GF2mon of classical first-order logic, where guard
relations satisfy conditions that can be expressed as monadic second-order definable clo-
sure constraints, is decidable. Our contribution is a slight generalisation of this result to
account for conditions which involve more than one guard relation. We believe that this
method is particularly promising for intuitionistic modal logic, where there exists a variety
of systems, most of them semantically defined, with various conditions connecting the intu-
itionistic and modal accessibility relations. General results on decidability and finite modal
property of intuitionistic modal logic have been proved in [33–35] using an embedding of
intuitionistic modal logics with n modalities in classical modal logics with n + 1 modal-
ities. However, their results can only be used to prove decidability of those intuitionistic
modal logics, for which the corresponding classical logic is known to be decidable.
The decidability proof presented in this paper does not give a good decision procedure,
since it proceeds by reduction to satisfiability of formulas of SkS (monadic second-order
theory of trees with constant branching factor k, [28]) which is non-elementary.1 It does
however provide a rather simple way to establish decidability, before looking for a decision
procedure tailored for a particular logic.
2. Two-variable monadic guarded fragment
We start by defining GF2mon as introduced in [14]. In the following definitions, FV(ϕ)
stands for the set of free variables of ϕ, and x¯ stands for a sequence of variables. We
assume a first order language which contains predicate letters of arbitrary arity, including
equality =, and no constants or functional symbols.
Definition 1. The guarded fragment GF of first-order logic is the smallest set that contains
all first-order atoms and is closed under boolean connectives and the following rule: if ρ
is an atom, ϕ ∈ GF, and x¯ ⊆ FV (ϕ) ⊆ FV (ρ), then ∃x¯(ρ ∧ ϕ) and ∀x¯(ρ → ϕ) ∈ GF (in
such a case ρ is called a guard).
The monadic two-variable guarded fragment GF2mon is the subset of GF containing
formulas ϕ such that (i) ϕ has no more than two variables (free or bound), and (ii) all
non-unary predicate letters of ϕ occur in guards.
3. Closure conditions
In this section we define the form of conditions on guards in GF2mon which yield
decidable fragments. We generalise the notion of mso-definable (monadic second order
definable) closure conditions from [14] so that they can apply to more than one relation.
Definition 2. Let W be a non-empty set. A unary function C on W is a simple closure
operator if, for all P,P ′ ⊆ W ,
1 Better complexity bounds for the guarded fragment with transitive guards were obtained in [17] and [31],
however their results apply only to transitivity, and it is not clear whether they could be extended to arbitrary
closure conditions, which we need for intuitionistic modal logics.
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(2) P ⊆P ′ implies C(P) ⊆ C(P ′) (C is monotone),
(3) C(P) = C(C(P)) (C is idempotent).
An (n + 1)-ary function C on the powerset of W is a parametrised closure operator if
C(P1, . . . ,Pn,−) for any P1, . . . ,Pn ⊆ W is a simple closure operator. We use the nota-
tion CP1,...,Pn for a closure operator parametrised by P1, . . . ,Pn.
Example 3. A reflexive, transitive closure operator for binary relations TC(P) is a simple
closure operator.
Example 4. A function InclP ′(P) =P ′ ∪P is a closure operator parametrised by P ′.
Definition 5. A condition on relation P is a simple closure condition if it can be expressed
in the form C(P) =P , where C is a simple closure operator.
A condition on relation P is a parametrised closure condition if it can be expressed in
the form CP1,...,Pn(P) =P , where CP1,...,Pn is a parametrised closure operator.
Example 6. Reflexivity-and-transitivity is a simple closure condition, since it can be ex-
pressed in the form TC(P) =P .
Example 7. Condition P ′ ⊆P is a closure condition on P parametrised by P ′, since it can
be stated as InclP ′(P) =P .
Given a set of closure conditions on a set of relations S, we want to preclude circularity
while closing off relations in S.
Definition 8. Let S be a finite set of relations, C a set of closure conditions on those
relations, and C(P) be all the closure conditions on the relation P from C. C is acyclic
if there is an ordering P1, . . . ,Pn of S such that all parameters in C(Pi+1) come from
P1, . . . ,Pi .
Furthermore, we are not interested in arbitrary closure operators, but only in those de-
finable in monadic second-order logic. Let ‖ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)‖M stand for the set of n-tuples
satisfying ϕ in modelM.
Definition 9. A closure operator CP1,...,Pm on n-ary relations is mso (-definable), if there
exists a monadic second-order formula CP1,...,PmP with predicate parameters P1, . . . ,Pm
and P , such that, for any modelM and any n-ary formula ϕ,
CP1,...,Pm
(‖ϕ‖M)= ∥∥CP1,...,PmP (ϕ/P )∥∥M
Example 10. The closure operator TC is definable by the mso formula
TCP (z1, z2) = ∀X
(
X(z1)∧ ∀x, y
(
X(x)∧ P(x, y) → X(y))→ X(z2))
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P -chain a1
P−→a2 . . . an−1 P−→an, connecting a1 and an, and that X(a1) and ∀x, y(X(x)∧
P(x, y) → X(y)) hold. Then X(a1) implies X(a2), X(a2) implies X(a3), etc., X(an) is
true, so TCP (a1, an) is true. Conversely, suppose there is no P -chain connecting a1 and an.
We can assign to X the set containing a1 and all the elements P -reachable from a1, which
makes X(an) and TCP (a1, an) false.
Example 11. The closure operator InclP ′ is definable by the mso (in fact, first-order) for-
mula
InclP ′P (z1, z2) = P ′(z1, z2)∨ P(z1, z2)
Theorem 12. Let φ ∈ GF2mon and C be an acyclic set of mso closure conditions on relations
in φ so that at most one closure condition is associated with each relation. It is decidable
whether φ is satisfiable in a model satisfying C.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof given in [14] for non-parametrised closure
conditions. In fact, it is slightly simpler, because in the original proof all relations are as-
sumed to be closed under equivalence (to show decidability of the fragment with equality).
However, closure under equivalence is a special case of a parametrised closure condition,
so we do not need to treat it separately.
Let φ ∈ GF2mon and let C be an acyclic set of mso closure conditions on relations in φ.
φ is satisfiable in a model satisfying C iff N , the Skolemised form of φ, is satisfiable in
a Herbrand model in which all conditions from C hold. The idea of the decidability proof
is to reduce the latter problem to satisfiability of formulas of SkS (the mso theory of trees
with constant branching factor k), where k is the number of Skolem function symbols
in N . We construct an mso formula MSON , in the vocabulary of SkS (an mso formula
containing only unary relation variables, unary functions and equality), such that MSON is
satisfiable in a tree model iff N has a Herbrand model satisfying closure conditions from C.
The construction proceeds in three stages: defining counterparts for predicate letters, for
clauses in N and finally for N itself.
Stage 1. For each predicate P in N , construct a formula ϕP in the vocabulary of SkS.
Let P(t1), . . . ,P (tm) be all positive literals of N containing P . Note that since φ ∈
GF2mon, each P is either a unary or a binary predicate; each positive literal will contain at
most one free variable. For each P(ti) above, a new unary second-order variable XP(ti ) is
introduced. Let t¯[z] be the result of substituting a variable z for the free variable of t¯ . Then,
if P is a unary predicate,
ϕP (z1) =
m∨
i=1
∃z(XP(ti )(z) ∧ z1 = ti[z])
and if P is a binary predicate,
ϕP (z1, z2) =
m∨
i=1
∃z(XP(ti1,ti2)(z) ∧ z1 = ti1[z] ∧ z2 = ti2[z])
Intuitively, the relation defined by ϕP is the minimal extension of P .
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sure ψP of ϕP with respect to the closure condition on P . For each such P we have a
single closure condition CP , which may be parametrised by other predicates. For simplic-
ity, assume that CP is parametrised by a single predicate P ′ that, in its own turn, has a
simple closure condition CP ′ . We know, then, that CP ′ is definable by an MSO formula
CP ′(z1, z2) containing P ′, and CP is definable by an MSO formula CP
′
P (z1, z2), containing
P ′ and P . First, we define the closure of P ′ with respect to its simple closure condition:
ψP ′(z1, z2) = CP ′(z1, z2)[ϕP ′/P ′]
that is, we replace every occurrence of P ′ in CP ′(z1, z2) with ϕP ′ .
Next, we define the closure of P with respect to its parametrised condition:
ψP (z1, z2) = CP ′P (z1, z2)[ψP ′/P ′, ϕP /P ]
In general, for any acyclic set C of conditions on the collection of relations S, we first
define the simple closures, then the closures parametrised by relations with simple closure
conditions, etc. The acyclicity of C ensures that this procedure can be carried out.
Stage 2. For each clause χ = {ρ1, . . . , ρl} in N , construct a formula MSOχ in the vo-
cabulary of SkS.
For every literal ρ in χ , a formula MSOρ is defined according to the following rule:
MSOρ =
{
Xρ(x), if ρ is a non-ground atom containing x
∃zXρ(z), if ρ is a ground atom
¬ψP (t¯), if ρ is ¬P(t¯)
where ψP is the formula constructed at stage 1. Now MSOχ is defined as MSOχ =∨
ρ∈χ MSOρ .
Stage 3. Finally, MSON = ∃X∀x¯∧χ∈N MSOχ , where X are all the free second order
variables and x¯ are all the first order variables in
∧
χ∈N MSOχ .
It remains to show that N has a Herbrand model satisfying the closure conditions in C
iff MSON is satisfiable in a tree. Let T be the tree corresponding to the term algebra of the
Herbrand universe of N .
(⇐) Assume that N has a Herbrand model A satisfying the closure conditions in C.
We want to show that T satisfies MSON . Fix witnesses for second-order variables Xρ of
MSON as follows:
(i) If ti is non-ground, then XP(ti ) = {a: A |= P(ti[a])}.(ii) If ti is ground, then XP(ti ) is a non-empty set.
We know that for each clause χ of N , and each tuple a¯, A |= χ(a¯). This means that for
each a¯, there is a literal ρ in χ such that A |= ρ(a¯). We show that for any a¯ and ρ, if
A |= ρ(a¯), then T |= MSOρ(a¯). Hence A |= χ(a¯) implies T |= MSOχ (a¯).
There are three cases to consider, depending on the form of ρ. The first two (non-ground
atom P(ti) and ground atom) are exactly the same as in [14]. If ρ is a negative literal
¬P(ti), we need to show that T |= ¬ψP (t¯)(a¯). It suffices to show that ‖ψP ‖A ⊆ PA.
Indeed, this, together with our assumption that A |= ¬P(t¯)[a¯], implies T |= ¬ψP (a¯).
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operators, CP
A
1
P (‖ϕP ‖A) ⊆ C
PA1
P (P
A). By definition of ψP , C
PA1
P (‖ϕP ‖A) = ‖ψP ‖A; fur-
thermore, since A satisfies conditions in C, CP
A
1
P (P
A) = PA; hence, ‖ψP ‖A ⊆ PA.
(⇒) Assume that MSON is true in T . Define a Herbrand model A as follows. The
universe of A is the set of nodes of T , and PA = ‖ψP ‖. First, we prove that A satis-
fies closure conditions C. To this end, we have to show that CP1P (PA) = PA. Indeed,
C
PA1
P (P
A) = CPA1P (‖ψP ‖) = C
‖ψP1‖
P (C
‖ψP1‖
P (‖ ϕP ‖)) = C
‖ψP1‖
P (‖ϕP ‖) = ‖ψP ‖ = PA.
Finally, we need to show that A satisfies all clauses in N . This part of the proof is
exactly the same as in [14]. 
4. Intuitionistic modal logics
One of the most promising applications of the result above is propositional intuition-
istic modal logic. Intuitionistic modal logic is simply a modal logic with intuitionistic,
rather than classical, base. The work on intuitionistic modal logic has several motivations:
mathematical interest; preference for intuitionistic rather than classical logic; desire to give
intuitionistic account of the notions studied in modal logic; and suitability of intuitionis-
tic modal logic for modelling certain computational phenomena. There exists an extensive
literature on intuitionistic modal logics, for example [5–7,10,12,13,15,20,22,23,26,27,32–
35]. A comprehensive survey can be found in [29]; for later references, see [36] and [24].
One of the motivations for intuitionistic modal logic is modelling computational phe-
nomena. A considerable strand of work in this area is based on the work by Moggi [21]
who extended a typed λ-calculus style semantics for functional programming languages
with an additional construct—a monad—to model effects in functional programming lan-
guages (such as the raising of exceptions etc.). The correspondence between simply-typed
λ-calculus and intuitionistic propositional logic is well known; it turns out that monads
correspond to S4-type modalities. This created a considerable interest in intuitionistic S4
modal logic, its proof theory and categorical and Kripke semantics [1,3,4,8,9,16,18,24,25].
Other applications of intuitionistic modal logic to modelling computational phenomena
included modelling incomplete information [32], communicating systems [30], hardware
verification [11,19], etc.
Intuitionistic modal languages are obtained by adding either or both of the unary con-
nectives  (necessity) and  (possibility) to the language of propositional intuitionistic
logic, which contains a set of propositional parameters Par = {p1,p2, . . .}, a unary con-
nective ∼, and binary connectives ∧, ∨, and ⇒. Analogously to ∀ and ∃, in intuitionistic
logic  and  are not required to be dual. It is also to be expected that for example(ϕ ∨ ∼ϕ) is not valid. In some intuitionistic modal logics, (ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡ (ϕ ∨ ψ)
is not valid either; see for example [32].
Kripke semantics of intuitionistic modal logics extends Kripke semantics for intuition-
istic propositional logic. An intuitionistic Kripke model is a structure M = (W,R,V )
such that (i) W = ∅, (ii) R is a reflexive and transitive binary relation on W , and (iii) V
is a function from Par into the powerset of W such that, for all w ∈ W and p ∈ Par,
if w ∈ V (p) and wRv, then v ∈ V (p) (condition we will refer to as upward persistence
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follows (→ and ¬ stand for classical implication and negation, respectively):
M,w |= p iff w ∈ V (p);
M,w |= ∼ϕ iff ∀v(R(w,v) → ¬(M, v |= ϕ));
M,w |= ϕ ∧ψ iff M,w |= ϕ andM,w |= ψ;
M,w |= ϕ ∨ψ iff M,w |= ϕ orM,w |= ψ;
M,w |= ϕ ⇒ ψ iff ∀v(R(w,v) → ¬(M, v |= ϕ) orM, v |= ψ);
To accommodate formulas of the form ϕ and ϕ, intuitionistic Kripke models are aug-
mented with binary relationsR andR. There is no single accepted way of defining the
meaning of  and  in intuitionistic logic. The following clauses are encountered in the
literature (see Chapter 3 of [29] for a comprehensive survey):
(1)M,w |=ϕ iff ∀v(wRv →M, v |= ϕ)
(2)M,w |=ϕ iff ∀v(wRv → ∀u(vRu →M, u |= ϕ))
(1)M,w |=ϕ iff ∃v(wRv ∧M, v |= ϕ)
(2)M,w |=ϕ iff ∀v(wRv → ∃u(vRu∧M, u |= ϕ))
Observe that definition (2) gives rise to a modality which does not distribute over dis-
junction (hence to a non-normal modal logic).
On top of the requirement that R is reflexive and transitive, some additional condi-
tions are usually imposed on R, R, and R. As a rule, these conditions specify the way
R, R, and R interact. For example, the following conditions usually accompany truth
clauses (1) and (1) (see [34]):
(1)R ◦R ◦R=R
(2)R ◦R−1 ◦R=R−1
In the conditions above, ◦ stands for relational composition:
R ◦R′ = {〈a, b〉: ∃c (〈a, c〉 ∈R & 〈c, b〉 ∈R′)}
Another condition occurring in the literature (see for example [11]) stipulates that
(3)R ⊆R
It turns out that many of the conditions on R, R and R, including conditions (1)–(3)
above, are mso-definable closure conditions as introduced in Section 3. For condition (3),
see Examples 4 and 7. Below is a proof for (1) and (2).
Proposition 13. Condition of the form P =P ′ ◦P ◦P ′ is an mso-definable closure condi-
tion, provided that P ′ is reflexive and transitive.
Proof. Consider a function CompP ′(P) = P ′ ◦ P ◦ P ′. If P ′ is reflexive and transitive,
then P ⊆ P ′ ◦ P ◦ P ′ by the reflexivity of P ′. P ′ ◦ P ◦ P ′ is obviously monotone in P ;
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is a closure operator provided that P ′ is reflexive and transitive. Conditions of the form
P ′ ◦P ◦P ′ = P can be expressed as closure conditions: CompP ′(P) = P . This condition
is mso-definable; in fact, it is definable by a first order formula:
CompP ′P (z1, z2) = ∃x∃y
(
P ′(z1, x)∧ P(x, y) ∧ P ′(y, z2)
) 
5. Embedding into the two-variable monadic fragment
In this section, we show that every intuitionistic modal logic L defined semantically
with any of the truth clauses (1)−(2) can be translated into GF2mon.
We define, by mutual recursion, two translations, τx and τy , so that a first-order formula
τv(ϕ) (v ∈ {x, y}) contains a sole free variable v, which intuitively stands for the world at
which ϕ is being evaluated in the Kripke model. τx is defined by
τx(p) := P(x)
τx(∼ϕ) := ∀y
(
R(x, y) → ¬τy(ϕ)
)
τx(ϕ ∧ψ) := τx(ϕ)∧ τx(ψ)
τx(ϕ ∨ψ) := τx(ϕ)∨ τx(ψ)
τx(ϕ ⇒ ψ) := ∀y
(
R(x, y) → (¬τy(ϕ) ∨ τy(ψ)))
τx(ϕ) := ∀y(R(x, y) → ∀x(R(y, x) → τx(ϕ)))
τx(ϕ) := ∀y(R(x, y) → ∃x(R(y, x)∧ τx(ϕ)))
τy is defined analogously, switching the roles of x and y. This translation assumes modal
truth clauses (2) and (2). Clauses for (1) and (1) are even simpler (and familiar
from classical modal logic):
τ ′x(ϕ) := ∀y(R(x, y) → τ ′y(ϕ))
τ ′x(ϕ) := ∃y(R(x, y)∧ τ ′y(ϕ))
Not surprisingly, since τx is a natural generalisation of the standard translation of modal
logic into classical predicate logic, the following theorem holds:
Theorem 14. Let φ be an intuitionistic modal formula and M be a class of models of
intuitionistic modal logic. Let M ∈ M. Then, M, w |= φ iff M |= τx(φ)[w] (where M is
taken as a model of first order logic with R, R, R interpreting R, R, R).
From the theorem it follows that if the satisfiability problem of GF2mon over M is decid-
able, then the satisfiability problem of intuitionistic modal logic over M is decidable.
It is well known that the guarded fragment is decidable over the class of all first order
models [2]. Decidability of GF2mon over models with reflexive, transitive guards is proved
in [14]. From this and from the fact that upward persistence for propositional variables oc-
curring in φ is expressible in GF2mon it follows immediately that basic intuitionistic modal
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per is to generalise the result of [14] to include classes of models defined using conditions
involving interaction between R, R and R.
Theorems 14 and 12 give us our main theorem:
Theorem 15. Let M be a class of intuitionistic modal models defined by an acyclic set
of mso closure conditions on R, R, and R so that at most one closure condition is
associated with each relation, and let φ be an intuitionistic modal formula. Then, it is
decidable whether φ is satisfiable in M.
6. Examples
In this section, we state several decidability results just to illustrate our approach.
The first example is by no means a surprise, although we doubt if anyone has proved
this for all possible combinations of truth definitions for modalities. Essentially this is
decidability of several flavours of basic intuitionistic modal logic (no conditions on the
modal accessibility relation).
Proposition 16. An intuitionistic modal logic L with two modalities  and , defined by
a class of models where
R ◦R−1 ◦R=R−1
R ◦R ◦R=R
and employing any of the truth definitions for modalities (1), (2), (1), (2) (in any
combination, e.g. (1) with (2); possibly with more modalities, provided that all truth
definitions can be translated in GF2mon), is decidable.
Proof. The class of models of L is defined by the following closure conditions on R,
R and R:
(1) R is reflexive and transitive;
(2) R ◦R−1 ◦R=R−1 ;
(3) R ◦R ◦R=R.
There is clearly at most one condition for each of the relationsR,R andR, and the set
of conditions is acyclic. We have shown in Examples 3 and 6 that the condition on R is a
closure condition and in Example 10 that it is mso-definable. By Proposition 13, conditions
on R and R are also mso-definable closure conditions.
We have shown that the class of models of L conforms to the conditions of Theorem 15
which proves that L is decidable. 
The next example is related to a known result (decidability of PLL [11]), but for a
slightly different logic (without fallible worlds):
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models where
R is reflexive and transitive
R ⊆R
and employing the truth definition (2) for the modality, is decidable.
Proof. The class of models of L is defined by the following closure conditions:
(1) TC(R) =R;
(2) TC(R) =R;
(3) InclR(R) =R (see Examples 4 and 7).
This set of conditions is acyclic and each condition is mso definable. However there are
two constraints associated with R: it is required to be closed both with respect to TC and
to InclR . To satisfy the conditions of Theorem 15 we need to combine them into one
mso definable closure condition. Observe that TC ◦ InclP ′ is a closure operator with the
property that for any relation P ,
TC
(
InclP ′(P))=P ⇔ TC(P) =P and InclP ′(P) =P
First of all, TC ◦ InclP ′ is monotone and increasing, since both TC and InclP ′ are. It is
also idempotent, because the result of applying TC ◦ InclP ′ to any relation P is a transitive
relation containing P ′, and any subsequent applications of TC ◦ InclP ′ are not going to
change it. So, TC ◦ InclP ′ is a closure operator. To prove that closure with respect to this
operator is equivalent to closure with respect to TC and InclP ′ separately, observe that one
direction is immediate: if P is closed with respect to TC and InclP ′ , then it is closed with
respect to TC ◦ InclP ′ . For the other direction, assume first that
TC
(
InclP ′(P))=P
but P is not closed with respect to InclP ′ , that is, it is a proper subset of InclP ′(P). But
since TC is increasing, P is then a proper subset of TC(InclP ′(P)), which contradicts the
assumption. Now assume that P is not closed with respect to TC, so that it is a proper
subset of TC(P). However, since P ⊆ InclP ′(P ), we have
TC(P) ⊆ TC(InclP ′(P ))
so P is a proper subset of TC(InclP ′(P )), which again contradicts the assumption. This
means that the conditions can be reformulated as
(1) TC(R) =R;
(2) TC(InclR(R)) =R;
and it is straightforward to show that the second condition is mso definable. 
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defining an intuitionistic modal logic in [1] as a closure condition. We also could not apply
our method to the logic IS4 defined in [29], since the truth conditions for IS4 formulas are
defined on pairs (w,d) (where w is a possible world and d an element from its domain),
so the image of IS4 under the standard translation is not in GF2mon.
7. Conclusions
We have described a general method for proving decidability of an intuitionistic modal
logic by translating it into monadic GF2 and showing that conditions on the intuitionistic
and modal accessibility relations can be expressed using mso definable closure operators.
We illustrate this method by showing that it works for various truth definitions for modal-
ities and various conditions on the intuitionistic and modal accessibility occurring in the
literature. Most of the decidability results for particular logics obtained as illustrations of
our proof are already known, but we believe that our method can easily yield new results,
especially for logics with non-normal modalities defined using the truth definition (2)
which are less well studied. Obviously, the same method works for intuitionistic logic with
more than two modalities, provided all truth definitions can be translated in GF2mon.
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